






Truck Escape Ramps: Determining the Need and the Location
Appeals Court Reviews "Legal Duty" and "Discretionary Function" in Runaway Ramp
Crash in Idaho
Effects of Aging on Older Drivers
Vision and Driving Performance in Older Drivers
Easy Ways to Use Waste Glass as Aggregate
Study Discussed Characteristics of Longer Combination Vehicles (LCVs) in Relation to
Roadway Design
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Appeals Court Reviews "Legal Duty" and "Discretionary Function" in Runaway Ramp
Crash in Idaho
A truck driver whose truck brakes failed on a downgrade charged the Twin Falls
Highway District in Idaho with negligence. The plaintiff claimed he could have avoided
the resulting crash if the two truck escape ramps situated along the route in question
had not been so poorly maintained. The District Court entered a summary judgment in
favor of the highway district on the basis that the District owed no duty to the truck drive
and that the District was immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act. The truck driver
appealed.
On September 26, 1987, Beny Freeman was hauling a truckload of corn for Green
Giant down the Magic Water Road grade near Buhl, Idaho. This road is part of the
District's road system. At about 2:00 a.m., Freeman started down the grade, his
second or third trip for the night. As he attempted to change gears, he found he could
not get the truck back in gear. Freeman's brakes also failed as he made further
attempts to stop. Eventually he lost control of his truck and crashed at the intersection
of Magic Water Road and Highway 30 in Twin Falls County. Freeman allegedly
sustained injuries as a result of this crash.
During the District Court hearings, the plaintiff made several charges regarding the two
runaway escape ramps which the Twin Falls Highway District had constructed on this
downgrade. Freeman had traveled this section of the highway on approximately ten
separate occasions in the one or two weeks prior to the accident. During those trips,
Freeman claimed that he had seen the ramps--one was toward the top of the grade and
one was toward the bottom--but they were both overgrown with wild thistle and they
were unsigned, unmarked, and unposted. The defendant contended the ramps could
not be seen at night because of their condition. Freeman also maintained that the soil
on both ramps was compacted and would not slow a vehicle and the bottom ramp's
angle was too severe for a safe exit.
In response to these accusations, the defendants showed that some maintenance work
had been done on these ramps on the day before this crash. The District Court
granted the summary judgment on the sole basis that the District had no duty to install
and maintain a runaway ramp. When Freeman moved for reconsideration, the court
denied the motion on the same grounds and entered an alternate ruling that the
installation and maintenance of the runaway ramps were discretionary functions.
Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, the District was immune from liability.
The Supreme Court of Idaho raised the following issues in regard to the facts
presented in the District Court: (1) whether the District had a legal duty to maintain the
runaway escape ramps in a reasonably safe condition and (2) whether the failure to
maintain those ramps was a "discretionary function."
The Supreme Court noted that motions for summary judgment may only be granted if
there is no issue of material fact after the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits have been construed most favorably to the opposing or nonmoving party, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court also notes that
the question of whether a legal duty in fact exists is a question of law for the court to
decide.
During its review, the Supreme Court referred to a case decided after the briefing in
this case was completed. Bingham v. Franklin County, 118 Idaho 318, 796 P.2d 527
(1990), also involved a plaintiff bringing suit against a county for failure to maintain a
public road. According to Idaho Code (I.C. 31-801-805, and 40-604(1) and {4}), "The
county is charged by statute with the duty of maintaining the roads." Idaho Code also
provides that "a highway district shall have all of the powers and duties that would by
law be vested in the commissioners of the county . . . " (I.C. 40-1310{1}). The Supreme
Court maintained that the same statutory duties imposed upon the county in Bingham
are imposed upon highway districts.
I.C. 40-109 defines the "Highway district system" and further defines "Highways" within
each highway district:
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"Highways" means roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or established for
the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. Highways shall include
necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, embankments, retaining
walls, bridges, tunnels, grade separation structures, roadside improvement,
adjacent lands or interests lawfully acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any
other structures, works or fixtures incidental to the preservation or
improvement of the highways . . . (Emphasis added.)
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The Supreme Court concluded that, based upon the definition of "highways" in the
Idaho Code, the runaway ramps are, as a matter of law, part of the highway district
road system. The District therefore had a duty to maintain those runaway escape
ramps. The Court further concluded that the record of this case reflects a disputed
question of fact over whether or not the ramps had been maintained, and a summary
judgment should not have been granted based upon the breach of duty to maintain the
escape ramps.
In addressing the question about whether maintaining the escape ramps is a
discretionary function, the Supreme Court again referred to Bingham v. Franklin County
to consider whether Franklin County's failure to maintain a public road was a
"discretionary function" as addressed in I.C. 6-904 (1). The Court emphasized the
difference between "discretionary function" immunity and "operational" immunity and
held that a material issue of fact remained which precluded summary judgment under
discretionary function immunity. The records failed to reveal whether the district court
believed that the repair of county roads was a routine matter or a matter intertwined
with policy making. The Supreme Court was unable to determine through the case
record whether a policy of road repair even existed.
As in Bingham v. Franklin County, there was insufficient information in the record for
the Court to determine whether or not the District's alleged failure to maintain the
runaway ramps was a discretionary function. Although there was evidence that some
maintenance was underway just prior to the accident in question, the facts available to
the court were insufficient to make any determination; and, therefore, the Supreme
Court found that the lower court granted a summary judgment prematurely. On
February 25, 1991, the Supreme Court reversed the decision for further consideration
in light of Bingham v. Franklin County, which was not available to the trial court when it
rendered its decision.
[For further reference, see Freeman v. Juker, (Idaho 1991) in West Publishing Vol. 808
Pacific Reporter, 2d Series, 1300]
Copyright © 1997 by TranSafety, Inc.
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