The Supreme Court of Bronx County entered judgment in favor of a motorist
who sued the City of New York because of injuries received when his car struck a
truck at an intersection where the City had not replaced a downed stop sign. The
Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed, finding the City had no liability for the
accident and resulting injuries. The appellate court cited two causes for the
accident: (1) the injured driver's misjudgment and failure to yield and (2) the
excessive speed of the truck.
The Accident
At about 5:30 p.m. on a dry, sunny September day, Walter Rasby drove
westbound into the intersection of East 137th Street and Willow Avenue in the
Bronx. Three weeks before that date, a sanitation truck had knocked down the
stop sign at the northeast corner of East 137th Street; the City of New York had
not yet replaced the sign. Normally that stop sign would have confronted Rasby,
requiring him to stop before crossing Willow Avenue.
Rasby testified he was not familiar with the intersection and did not know
there had been a stop sign at that corner. He said he looked to the right and saw
a RAD Oil Transport Corporation truck approaching southbound on Willow Street;
however, he stated the "truck was so far back and I didn't think there was any
problem with it." Rasby said he was no longer watching the truck when he
accelerated from about 10 or 15 miles per hour to approximately 20 miles per hour
and entered the intersection. He hit the truck broadside, just behind the driver's
door. According to a witness, the truck was traveling between 40 and 50 miles per
hour--which was faster than the posted speed limit.
Nine years before the accident, Rasby lost all vision in his left eye. This
condition left him without three-dimensional depth perception.
Trial Court Decision
In Rasby's suit against the City of New York and RAD Oil Transport
Corporation, et al., the trial court found the plaintiff free of negligence. Prior to
summation, RAD Oil and its driver had settled with the plaintiff for $3 million.
Assigning liability at 70 percent for the City and 30 percent for the truck company
and its driver, the jury awarded in the amount of $20,658,599.38.
The City moved for a dismissal or, in the alternative, a setting aside of the
verdict because the jury's award was excessive and the decision contrary to the
weight of evidence. The court responded with a ruling to allow a retrial "on
damages unless plaintiff consented to a reduction of the awards for past pain and
suffering from $3,000,000 to $1,100,000 and future pain and suffering from
$13,000,000 to $3,700,000 . . . ." When Rasby died two months after the court
ordered a conditionally reduced award, the reduced award became the amount of
the judgment against the City. Although the decision came after the plaintiff's
death, the court made the award effective five days before Rasby died.
Appellate Court Decision
When the City appealed the decision, the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division reversed. The appellate court found that the downed stop sign did not
create an inherently dangerous or confusing intersection. Citing Tomassi v. Town
of Union (46 N.Y.2d 91, 98, 412 N.Y.S.2d 842, 385 N.E.2d 581), the court found:
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The only proximate or concurring causes of the accident were, as a matter
of law, the excessive speed of the RAD truck and plaintiff's misjudgment of
when the truck would reach the intersection.
Although the appellate court reversed on a matter of law, they added that
they would also have reversed based on the facts. The court's opinion was that
the jury's decision to assign no liability to the plaintiff was contrary to the weight of
evidence. Rasby saw the truck but accelerated into the intersection instead of
yielding right-of-way. McKinney's Vehicle and Traffic Law 1140(b) provides that
the driver on the left must yield to the driver on the right when two vehicles enter
an intersection at approximately the same time and states:
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If the two vehicles are so near the intersecting point that there is a chance
of collision if both keep on at their respective speeds, then the vehicle
approaching from the left must slow down to a stop to permit the vehicle
approaching from the right to proceed.
According to the appellate court, the plaintiff's failure to obey the law and
yield to the truck on his right constituted negligence that the jury could not
disregard.
Finally, the appellate court determined that the trial court erred and caused
prejudice against the City by not instructing the jury according to PJI 2:22, which
states:
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[A] person laboring under a physical disability must use caution
commensurate with the increased hazard caused by such disability.
Referring to Hosmer v. Distler (150 A.D.2d 974, 975, 541 N.Y.S.2d 650),
the appellate court judged the trial court should have instructed the jury that the
plaintiff had a legal responsibility to drive with sufficient caution to compensate for
his known disability.
Given their reversal on a matter of law, the appellate court did not address
other issues in the City's appeal. They unanimously reversed the decision against
the city, without costs, and dismissed the complaint.
[For further reference, see Sherman v. City of New York and RAD Oil Transport Corp. (A.D. 1 Dept. 1994)
from West Publishing Vol. 614 New York Supplement, 2d Series, 412]