William R. Langton suffered injuries when his bicycle wheel
dropped into an open space next to a grate on a Westport,
Connecticut street. Langton sued the town for damages. A jury
verdict from the Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-
Norwalk favored the town. When Langton appealed, the Appellate
Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court decision, holding
that (1) Langton did not try to prove that Westport had notice of
a design defect in the grate and (2) the plaintiff did not prove
the town knew the grate was a hazard for bicycle wheels.
Trial Court Decision
While he rode on a public street within the city limits of
Westport, Langton's bicycle wheel dropped to the axle into "a
space between a grate and a door of the grate."
To recover damages for the injuries he suffered, Langton
sued the town, alleging Westport breached its duties under
General Statutes § 13a-149. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed
the grate was in a "defective and dangerous condition" and the
town had actual and constructive notice of this dangerous
condition. In addition, Langton argued the roadway was dangerous
and defective because of the uneven grate and the space
surrounding it. The town, according to the plaintiff, was
negligent in not maintaining the grate and in not filling the
hazardous space. Langton did not claim the hazardous condition
was the result of a design defect that had existed since the
grate was installed.
Responding, the town acknowledged that on the date of
Langton's injuries the grate was a dangerous condition.
Moreover, they admitted the dangerous condition of the grate
caused the bicyclist's injuries. They denied, however, that the
grate's condition was the sole proximate cause of the injuries,
and they also denied they had actual or constructive notice of
the danger and, therefore, failed to remedy a danger they knew
existed.
In its decision, the jury responded to the question:
"Assuming that the gap in the grate was a defect in the highway,
did the town of Westport have notice of the hazard or risk posed
by this defect prior to the date of this accident?" When the
jury answered no to this question, questions regarding whether
the allegedly defective grate was the sole proximate cause of
Langton's injuries or whether the bicyclist was contributorily
negligent were never answered. Given the jury determination that
Westport had no notice of a hazardous condition, the court found
in favor of the town.
Appellate Court Decision
In view of the town's admission that the condition of the
grate was hazardous, the plaintiff's appeal argued the jury's
decision that the town had no notice of the hazard was not in
conformity with the evidence and had to be a mistake. The appeal
made no claim of error in rulings or procedures by the trial
court.
The trial court had reasoned that the plaintiff's argument
constituted a claim that the original design of the grate was
defective. The trial court held that under General Statutes §
13a-149, the plaintiff could not recover on a claim for defective
design. Pointing to Hoyt v. Danbury (69 Conn. 341, 352, 37 A.
1051 (1897)), however, the appellate court offered:
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A claim arising from a defective design is not per se
incompatible with recovery under § 13a-149. If the design
defect is so egregious, requiring obvious correction, to
neglect to make the repairs to correct the design defect can
be a basis for an action under the statute.
Thus, if the court decided that Langton's arguments
implicitly showed that the design of the grate was defective and
the town had negligently permitted the hazardous defect to exist
knowing it could cause injury to bicyclists, the statute would
allow recovery. However, the appeals court felt the plaintiff
never tried to prove that the grate was hazardous from the
beginning. In fact, Langton had bicycled on this stretch of road
and over this grate "about 100 times" without having a problem
and without being aware that a hazard existed. Moreover, the
town's bicycle commission had never received a complaint about
the grate.
Therefore, the appellate court concluded the jury's decision
that the town had received no notice of a dangerous condition was
not wrong, even if protection from liability for design defects
would have been determined not to apply in this case. The
plaintiff did not argue the grate was defective in its original
design.
Langton did argue, however, that the grate was a defect on
the date of his injuries. According to Hall v. Burns (213 Conn.
461-2, 569, A.2d 10 (1990)), a defect is: "[a]ny object in . .
. the traveled path, which would necessarily obstruct or hinder
one in the use of the road . . . or which, from its nature and
position, would be likely to produce that result . . . " The
town acknowledged the existence of a defect. However, the
defect's existence alone did not allow recovery. To recover,
Langton had to prove the town "had actual or constructive notice
of the defect and had a reasonable opportunity to correct the
defect." The jury concluded the plaintiff had not proven the
town had notice, and the appellate court determined this
conclusion was not contrary to the evidence. The appeals court
affirmed the trial court's finding in favor of Westport.
[William R. Langton v. Town of Westport (Conn.App. 1995) can be
found in West Publishing Vol. 658 Atlantic Reporter, 2d Series,
602]